« Les crimes contre l’humanité trans-cendent l’individu puisqu’en attaquant l’homme, est visée, est niée, l’Humanité. C’est l’identité de la victime, l’Humanité, qui marque la spécificité du crime contre l’humanité », affirmaient en 1997 les juges du Tribunal international pour l’ex-Yougoslavie à l’appui de leur premier jugement. L’expression même de crime contre « l’humanité » distingue ce crime de tous les autres et souligne son extrême gravité. Mais, si grave soit-il, un crime ne constitue un crime contre l’humanité qu’à condition de comporter des éléments constitutifs précis et de s’inscrire dans une attaque généralisée ou systématique. Cet ouvrage propose d’éclairer cette dénomination pénale née à Nuremberg en analysant sa formation en droit international, puis les variations de sa réception au niveau national. Il en explore ainsi la richesse mais pointe aussi ses ambiguïtés au travers des applications passées et présentes, esquissant déjà les transformations à venir.
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Brief presentation
Mireille Delmas-Marty is a professor at the Collège de France.
Isabelle Fouchard is an associate researcher working with the Chair of Comparative Legal Studies and Internationalization of Law, Collège de France.
Emanuela Fronza is an assistant professor at the University of Trento.
Laurent Neyret is a senior lecturer at the University of Versailles-Saint-Quentin.
Crime Against Humanity
In 1997, the judges of the ICTY, in support of their first sentencing judgement (Erdemovic, 1996), stated: ‘Crimes against humanity also transcend the individual because when the individual is assaulted, humanity comes under attack and is negated. It is therefore the concept of humanity as victim which essentially characterises crimes against humanity’.
In this statement, which is both legal (‘crime’, ‘victim’) and philosophical (‘when the individual is assaulted, humanity comes under attack and is negated’), the judges’ intention was to point out with force the specificity of the crime against humanity, a notion that had already been inscribed in the statute of the Nuremberg Trials, but not legally exploited.
The very expression ‘crime against humanity’ distinguishes this crime from all others. It seems obvious that its first specificity ensues from its extreme gravity, making it, whatever the circumstances, a particularly inhuman crime. But all crimes, however inhuman they may be, are not crimes against humanity they must also be massive in scale.
In this book, the authors take stock of this penal qualification today. They explore its rich scope, but also point out its ambiguities and probable developments in years to come.
Commentaires
Thanks for taking this opportunity to discuss this, I feel fervently about this and I like learning about this subject.
air jordans